Greek nationalism and press: mutual influence on each others` formation

Ismayil Fataliyev 

The 1789 Great French Revolution shook up the entire Europe, and the spirit of nationalism, one of its inventions, started spreading out throughout the continent including the Balkans. First the Serbs and Greeks, then the Bulgarians, Armenians, Arabs, Albanians, and finally the Turks caught up with this departing train.   

The Napoleon`s wars, its aftermath postponed the appearance of the modern Greek state, but never forbade it. Clientilist in nature reigned by a compromised western monarchic family (from Bavaria), and only partially including the desired “Greek lands”, the modern Greek state was somehow born in 1830. The Greek case is distinct from the rest in the Balkans as the 1821-1830 Greek uprising/revolution following the post-Napoleon period proved to be a precedent and no-return point. The whole preceding century various Greek actors inside and outside of what is now Greece were contributing in one way or another to forging the contemporary national identity: merchants, enlighters, publicists, writers, and politicians. One of the outcomes of their activities was the emergence of the Greek press. The latter in turn further helped to deepen Greek nationalism culminating in the so-called Megali Idea, the most popular Greek nationalistic narrative at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, which is still alive in Greek far-right nationalists` minds. 

A national ethos is formed and a nation is collectively invented. It is a collective construct needed for self-identification. The nation is a community of people sharing some common language , faith, cultural traits, etc. According to followers of constructivism, the culture-oriented the scientific approach in the issue of nationality, the latter does not exist at the biological level i.e. one does not inherit it via genes or mother`s milk. Interestingly, even in the absence of common insitutions, education systems, language, and cultural codes, nations get formed. A national culture is a certain symbolic system that distinguishes one community from another even though the national state is still not born. This sows the seeds that later turn into nationalism which is an excellent tool to separate “your nation” from the empire at least, and expand further at most. 

Ethno-history is an inseparable part of this process as it brings together kinpeople referring to common “myths, origins, sacred territories, etc.”. The Greek case is emblematic as both in pre and post-revolutionary periods the famous Greeks referred to Hellenism and Byzantium roots of their period to forge a modern Greek nation which also caused certain ambiguity.  Simply put, it all comes down to the time, strength, and unification of institutions crucial for this process, especially the education system. The question is who plays the main role in the process - the people themselves, the society around its active individuals, some kind of supra structures that these people come up with like schools and universities or other cultural tools like books etc. 

Leonidas Philaras, Methodios Anthrakitis, Rigos Phereos, Eugenios Vulgaris and others are among the most prominent Greek enlighteners, theologists, teachers, intellectuals of the 18th century with the latter printing journals in 1789-1799. However, the driving force in catalyzing the process was the merchant social strata since without their resources Greece would not have gained independence, even the formal one. Most of them like Rigos Phereos who allegedly during his execution in Belgrade in 1797 said he sowed freedom, let others come and reap it, was originally from a merchant family. 

Representatives of this social layer together with colleagues outside the Ottoman Empire financially contributed to the founding of schools and dissemination of books in Greek among their compatriots. It was possible thanks to wealth gained via long-lasting control over ommerce in mostly the European part of the empire. The heterogeneous will of merchants meant that not all of them originally promoted the idea of political independence. The majority wanted relative changes. The lesser group among them favored the usurpation of the wealth of Turks and other Muslims. Not to forget the smallest group of merchants with radical views who desired national independence even at the cost of social revolution. 

Despite various standpoints, it proves undoubtful that changes could not have proved possible without their sponsorship in the printing of various publications and editions of the newspapers. For example, a Greek trader called Prigos, in Amsterdam, in the 1760s printed books at his own expense and sent them in hundreds to his native land.. This support started to fade away after 1815 when Greek writers, other representatives of the "intelligentsia" and bureaucracy took them over in this respect. However, the main thing was that the process was already launched. The history of Greek typography dates back to the 15th century when the Greeks lost control of Constantinople. Fleeing to various European destinations, their financial and intellectual potential spread the word about the classical Greek works among Europeans. The first Greek printing press was founded in Venice by Laonikos the Cretan or Nikolaos Kabbadatos and the Cretan Alexander at the end of the 15th century. Along with classical literature, religious texts were printed too. The Patriarchate of Constantinople was among the buyers as at that time Ottoman Empire did not have its own typography up until it appeared in the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia resisted the influence of Catholicism and Protestantism in the Ottoman empire.

Since the second half of the 18th century, the printing press of the Greek diaspora was influenced by the European Enlightenment contributed to the intellectual success of the Greek Enlightenment id. the driving force of upcoming changes among Greeks. Curiously, It was Vienna, the capital of the neighboring Austrian monarchy, once a bitter rival that now was enjoying almost a century-long peaceful period with Turks that turned into the last important production center of Greek books and newspapers before the Greek Revolution when it moved to the Kingdom of Greece.There are different reasons for that. First of all, the Greek business circles controlled most of the banking system in the Habsburg Empire. At the end of the 18th century, 90 out of 120 banks in the Habsburg monarchy belonged to the Greek community and the Habsburg monarchy needed and supported Greeks in this respect. Secondly, the Austrian monarchy in the 18th-19th century had an authority that upheld a relatively liberal standpoint on many issues including freedom of the press. 

Last but not least, is the matter of realpolitik. Although not fighting Turks overtly, Austria needed to have what is now called a soft power or leverage to slowly but surely weaken its Muslim neighbors. The Ottoman Empire was fastly entering its decadent era and the Habsburgs wanted to profit from it. The Habsburg monarchy nominally was considered a big power but did not play a leading role in Europe and could only cope with weaker Turks. Vienna turned a blind eye on the Greek community`s activities towards the Greek Enlightenment on its territory, particularly the functioning of Greek newspapers even though they caused tensions among the Habsburgs and Ottomans. But in most cases despite censorship, they continued to be published partially due to current political conjuncture and liberal views of the ruling Austrian monarch.

Vienna was a prime spot of destructive activities for the Ottoman Empire and the fact that the most important representative of the Greek diaspora, Adamantios Korais, lived and published his works in Paris was rather an exception that reinforced this rule. Greeks` glorious past and a still more glorious future due that modern Greeks are the descendants of the ancient Greeks, the subversion of present and existing institutions was in the centerstage of Korais`s activities. He realized the great importance of the invention of printing and, till his death in 1833 abroad he never stopped encouraging his compatriots returning to Greece to print newspapers “to distribute the news describing all the bad things we go through or “so that people can learn the news”. 6 It was Korais who advised to send Konstantinos Tobras, later to be known as the national printer, to Paris to learn from Ambrosio Firmin Didot, the well-known representative of the Dido printing house dynasty. Undoubtedly, the pre-revolutionary press contributed to the development of a Greek national consciousness and the revolutionary spirit which were prerequisites for the following struggle. Whereas ordinary Greeks, especially the younger generation, were switching to dimotiki (simplified folk language invented by Enlighters who freed it from incomprehensive liturgic Greek widespread among Greek Orthodoxy), numerous printing presses that were owned or managed by Greek diaspora followed that trend in appearing in Greek newspapers.

At the turn of the 18-19 centuries within 30-35 years a dozen newspapers and other periodicals appeared. The first one was printed in 1784 by George Ventotis. Not a single sample of this newspaper survived. Considering it could harm the foreign policy of the empire after two months of publication (April-May 1784) it was suspended. In 1790 it was Markidis Pouliou brothers who obtained a license to publish a newspaper even under the terms of state censorship and a risk of closing-down at any time. The newspaper called Efimeris (Newspaper) followed daily affairs of the nation, its past, present, and future, and international developments. It was aimed not to focus on politics and war but business as well. The founding brothers decided to print it on Thursdays and Fridays to avoid scandals with the Ottomans (many successor newspapers also followed suit) with a reservation to publish a separate edition and distribute it among Greeks of the Ottoman empire in case something happened there. One of its first subscribers was the famous Rigas Phereos who cooperated with the publishing house and spread his liberal ideas via the newspaper. Efimeris wrote about his execution in Belgrade and turned him into the “protomartyr of the revolution”. The Markidis brothers were accused of helping Rigas to spread his revolutionary message against the Ottoman occupation of the Balkans. It took twelve years after Ephemeris ceased production for the News for the East Part, the second Greek newspaper, to appear in 1811. Originally edited by Eufronio Popovic from Kozani, its publisher, an Austrian censor Joseph Hall promised to focus on business and industry rather than political news and never to antagonize the Ottomans. Despite this, the paper stopped later that year.

In 1812 Dimitrios Alexandridis published the newspaper Greek Telegraph which focused on politics, literature, and trade. Inspired by the Austrian “Newspaper of Vienna” and “Austrian Observer”, it proved to be quite successful as Alexandridis considered it “the best work thoroughly put together that aims at enlightening a nation and contributing to the happiness of its people”. In 1817 Dimitrios Alexandridis published Literary Telegraph, a supplement that continued till 1836. 

In 1811 a major literary magazine, Hermes the Scholar, came out. Considered to be a major contribution to Greek journalism, it was freely distributed in Greek schools in Vienna, Bucharest and even Constantinople and published content on science, mathematics, literature, and the Greek language. But it lasted only two years supposedly due to Austian suspicions of anti-state activities of its publisher Archimandrite Anthimos Gazis on behalf of Russians. In 1816 Theoklidos Farmakidis from Larissa and Constantin Kokkinakis from Chios, another publisher, took it over. According to Koreas, it was a sacred medium vital for the rebirth of the nation.

Finally, in 1819 Athanasius Stageritis published the journal Kalliope, an analogue of the Hermes the Scholar in terms of content. In other European capitals as well the Greek newspapers saw daylight e.g. the journals Athena and Melissa (the Bee) in Paris and Iris and Museum in London.

The press of the last decade prior to the Revolution, mostly literary though, became an expression of the spiritual interests of the Greek intelligentsia and of the wider cultural and social goals with ultimate goal of liberation. 4 . Greek newspapers were selective in news and rarely published news that could undermine this goal. When the Greek Revolution erupted in 1821 and the Greek patriarch in Constantinople excommunicated Aleksandros Ypsilantis, its leader, the Ottoman authorities demanded the Greek media in Vienna to publish this news.

While the Greek Telegraph after long hesitation did it, Hermes and Kalliopi chose to stop publishing. Another indicator of bias in publishing news during the Revolution by the Greek press was the one-sided reporting on atrocities and casualties Greek and Muslim civilians suffered. While news on cases of Greek death toll was disseminated openly and formed public opinion in European countries, not a single word was said about Greek guerilla atrocities. Needless to say that by the Revolution in mainland Greece no newspaper had existed. When it started the Ottomans allegedly destroyed the printing houses of Kydonies and Chios in 1821 and 1822 respectively, while foreigners in the empire who held commissions did not want to antagonize the Sultan. For example, an English Commissioner prohibited printing houses of the Ionian Islands from providing any assistance to revolutionaries. Allegedly, the abovementioned Greek Orthodox patriarchate, a solemn devotee of the Sultan, who never supported the Revolution in the fear of getting deprived of benefits it had enjoyed throughout centuries, was behind these decisions. Nevertheless, more territories got under the control of revolutionaries, the chances were growing to establish a first Greek newspaper in Greece. Theoklidis Farmakidis returned to Greece and founded Salphinx Eliniki (Greek bridge) in August 1821 in Kalamata.

Demetrius, Alexander Ypsilantis`s brother, also a member of the Filiki Eteria, the ideological background of revolutionaries, brought to Hydra a printing press from Trieste, which was used in various places until it reached Kalamata that year. The printing press was named National Typography and printed revolutionary proclamations along with the Salphinx Eliniki. To serve the needs of the administration, the National Typography was moved in 1822 to Corinth where that same year, two major editions of the new rulers, unrecognized though, were printed. Meanwhile, in 1821 Alexander Mavrocordatos, a famous future Greek politiciaEmpiren, brought another press from France to Missolonghi. In 1824 a printing house was founded in Hydra thanks to equipment sent from France and the newspaper The Friend of the Law was published. The lithographic press of Stanhope that ended up in Nafplio, the first capital of the Kingdom of Greece, together with the press of Mavrokordatos became the core of the Printing House of the Administration. 

The second of Stanhope`s printing presses was brought to Athens and the newspaper Ephemeris of Athens was established in 1824. From 1828 onwards private printing houses such as Koromila or Estia (still existing) started appearing in various parts of Greece and Greek typography became consolidated in the newly established Greek State. Thus, while in the 16th century, printing allowed the spread of literary works and contributed to the creation of a Greek cultural identity mainly outside the Ottoman empire, starting from the second half of the 18th and throughout the 19th centuries, newspapers along with literary texts published by the National Printing House formed the modern national Greek identity.

One aspect should be mentioned when we talk about the Greek press in pre-revolutionary time. Not all the publications met meeting criteria of that time's Western analogues. Partially, it can be explained with the fact that the English, French, Dutch papers etc. had been around for three centuries before the Greek papers appeared. It meant the former had a longer evolution period. 

With that being said, it should be added that different genres of publications caused the emergence of different press products such as journal, news-pamphlet, periodical, newsletter, leaflet, magazine, or newsbook. Some newspapers such as Ephemeris of 1790, or Εllenikos Telegraphos, which did not appear early were closer to European newspapers in terms of its content (topics on the French Revolution, the 1787-1792 Russia-Turkey war, etc). The printing of the first Greek ‘newspapers’ could not take place anywhere other than in a large center, where a free Greek community worked and educated itself. The first Greek publication which complied in all respects to the traditional sense of a newspaper that embraced the needed factors of time, content, and usage, was also named Ephemeris. It was published in Athens and did not appear until 1873.

By this time independent Greece was pregnant with the nationalistic and irredentist ideology that led to wars with the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Called the Megali idea, (Great Idea), the term appeared for the first time during the debates of Prime Minister Ioannis Kolettis with King Otto prior to the adoption of the 1843 constitution. Undoubtedly brand new, the idea found many followers among Greeks in the Greek state per se.When King Otto did not intervene in Crete to back the 1841 uprising there it cost him popular support. 

It came to dominate foreign relations and played a significant role in domestic politics for much of the first century of Greek independence. When the 1862 constitution was adopted, the new King, George, was inscribed there as a king of Hellens, referring to all Greeks inside and outside the Kingdom. The Megali idea implied the so-called liberation of Greeks from Ottoman rule and restoration of the Byzantine Empire with the Greek capital of Constantinople. In a certain sense, it was contradicting itself because of two main points it referred to ie. Hellenism and the glory of the Byzantium past contradicted one another and was doubtful. The pagan Hellenism went against the main unifying bond of Greeks - Orthodox Christianity. When it comes to the second point, the Byzantium was Eastern Roman, not Greek Imperium. Moreover, the big question was who the true heir of Byzantium was: the Ottomans, who adopted a huge number of state elements from the conquered empire, or the Greeks, who practically lost all of their Byzantine identity.

Gradually, Greek nationalists once they had achieved an independent state, started shifting from Hellenism, the mainly unifying idea among pre-revolutionary Greeks and their sympathizers to the “glory Byzantium past and modern Greek Byzantium idea. The Megali idea initiators managed to combine these two and selectively use strong sides towards particular audiences. They exploited it via newspapers to attract audiences both within and outside the country, primarily the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire as well as public opinion and authorities in big European capitals.

Interestingly, the Greek newspapers in Greece followed the irredentist narrative aimed primarily at domestic audiences, while at the same time backing the Hellenism narrative in Greek newspapers published in the Ottoman empire. At minimum, once successful, they assumed this approach as the first stage to smoothly spread the Megali Idea among Greek subjects of the Sultan. It was not easier to impose ideas due to the fact that not all Greek journalists in the empire favored the Megali idea. From 1850 and on, under the Tanzimat reforms, the Sultan equalized the rights of all subjects, regardless of religion. Many Greeks were back to the empire, which was much more attractive than the Peloponnesian mountains. Post-Tanzimat is known as the period of dual relations between the Greek press in independent Greece and the press belonging or managed by Ottoman subjects of Greek origin. 

While the latter was solid with compatriots in the Greek state in the issue of the 1870 Bulgarian schisma (the creation of the separate Bulgarian church that meant the division of the Orthodox Christianity in the Ottoman empire and a direct threat to the Patriarchate authority and monopoly) and equality of rights of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, the Greek-led Ottoman newspapers were not supportive of the Megali idea. It happened due to the fact that Greeks as other non-Muslim minorities in the Empire were interested in a unified state, preferably federalist one, with growing importance of their role in the state`s administration and saw the Tanzimat reforms and following announcement of the 1876 Constitution as a road map for this.

Vice versa, there was news for the Greek Kingdom periodically with high criticism for its bad administration. Among two famous Greek papers, Konstantinoupolis obeyed the ideology of Patriarchate and turned down the irredentist plan of Megali Idea. It was closed down because of criticism of the Sultan`s decision to divide the Monolite Orthodox church. Since 1872, a change can be observed in covering news from the Greek state. The journalists started to devote more space in the second or third page of the newspaper for news related to the political developments in the Greek Kingdom even though a decade before only the last page contained news about the Greek state.

The other well-known newspaper run by Greek subjects was the Thraki. Launched after the closure of Konstantinoupolis it advised the Ottoman press not to participate in journalist fight with the Greek Kingdom’s newspapers since the rumors were being generated by their articles along with their nationalist rage were only aiming to harm the ‘fraternal and ‘harmonic’ cohabitation in the Empire. 6 It also called on the president of the Greek Letters Association to stop harmful activities on Greek irredentism in the province of Macedonia. 

In short, the higher the level of imperial integration was, the more the Ottoman Greek ommunity`s nationalism would differ from the one in the Kingdom of Greeks. It meant the

Megali idea promoted by the Greek press did not manage to set a strong foot among Greek subjects of the Sultan. Yet. Despite the despotism of Sultan Abdul Hamid the Second who leaned to Islamism during his rule, many political posts were still available to the Greeks. The latter were ambassadors in London and Paris. Financial and economic levers, especially in the European part, was in the hands of the big bankers of Galata - who were mainly Ottoman Greeks.

However, at the turn of the century, disappointment and distinction between Greek`s future vision over the empire and the one of the ruling family widened. The emergence and subsequent spread of pan-Turkism ideology, the idea of uniting all Turks under the rule of the Sultan i.e. the idea contradictory to Megali's Idea but not least nationalistic one, initiated and supported by Young Turks, a group of young military officers, that brought them to power in 1907 as the result of successful coup-d`etat, proved that clashes between two nationalisms were inevitable. 

By the time temporarily the Megali idea became a winner by the summer 1920, it would have many supporters among Ottoman Greeks. The capture of Constantinople and cheering of Greek army (not the main force though) units by Greeks as well as widespread support in Smyrna was nothing but proof. However, two years later the Greek community would pay a high price once the Megali idea totally failed with casualties and a mass exodus to the kingdom of Greece.

Restricted environment and NGO activism in Azerbaijan: Shall we dance?

Ismayil Fataliyev

This piece of writing tries to shed light on how a real eco-activist NGO can succeed in Azerbaijani NGO-restrictive surroundings.via the experience of the Ecofront, a young ecoactivist group from Azerbaijan. In it, I'll try to analyze how an activist/organization can benefit both personally and professionally without betraying its/his/her values, and dignity and most importantly losing public trust. 

Conclusions stemming from this content are not ultimate neither for every geography and its society with its specificities and peculiarities, nor for every domain of NGO activism within one geography and society. However, they could be applied to every NGO in various domains so that they adjust them in their activities in a restrictive environment. These conclusions are rather guidelines to follow to different extent and scale, not postulates.

The Azerbaijani authority`s methods of ruling resemble the ones of a typical Azerbaijani family with the father taking all decisions and responsibility. Paternalistic in essence, it denies equality in the contribution of all grassroots in decision-making just as the father who would tell off his child for urging the former what to do. 

However, despite such a hierarchy the authorities leave unofficial communication channels open to be used by activists with relevant expertise in various domains who can bring true changes and contribute to tackling various problems. Why? While the father would pretend to listen to his child, he could benefit from ideas and recommendations as he realizes, as a famous saying goes, two heads are better than one, especially when the child `head is younger and full of modern thoughts with competitive advantages.

 

However, once a problem is solved or challenge is met, the authorities won't accept that it happened due to the recommendations and efforts of a particular activist or a group. Why? It will simply take it for granted just as the father who considers a family member's contribution as a duty. And even more so, authorities/fathers won`t remark and thank activists/children, at least in public. If it does so, the father/authorities risk damaging its image, credibility, prestige, and more importantly, intentionally breaking its monopoly. 

On one hand, such modus vivendi implies a constant reluctance to acknowledge non-state actors. On the other, the modus operandi it introduces provides the opportunity for community activists and groups not only to exist but effectively function. That is what I call the set game rules.

In some geographies, it can sound bizarre as ardent supporters of democratic values could claim it is unnatural. While true in principle, one must accept that the world is diverse. So are the countries it consists of and the people they populate. No doubt that people around the world tend to share common universal values, and take for granted human moral regulations and general rules for cohabitation in a society (Ten Commandments, good and evil, the concept of sin, etc). Simply put, people are well aware of what is good and what is bad. However, the more specific norms and rights behind them become, the more distinct the attitude of various societies, let alone their authorities, towards them. As another famous Azerbaijani saying goes, all fingers on one palm differ. Different communities interpret, perceive, and accept norms and attitudes towards them differently.

 

There are existing problems and challenges that both democratic and autocratic countries have. While the former enjoys a plurality of opinions, various freedoms, a high level of accountability, and power change in case of failure in tackling these problems, the latter`s citizens do not possess these advantages. Their activists are forced to carry out activities within restricted areas and scope. And here comes the dilemma. The more autocratic the political system that a certain society has, the more dangerous the consequences for individual and collective actions of its active members, NGOs are. 

The potential danger and menace are the intersection NGOs and activists find themselves at and have to take defining and decisive steps. In these circumstances, NGOs and/or active society members have several options to choose from. Either they halt their activities altogether or claim themselves as NGOs while retreating from their original standpoint. By doing so, the latter strictly observe set game rules even personally benefiting from them from time to time, leaving intact authority`s red lines due to fear of reactions. Whereas the third group adjusts existing set game rules into its activities and tries to push back those red lines to achieve its goals without violating them altogether and putting itself in potential danger. The non-violation of red lines is a must to have results attainable and activities - sustainable.

While public opinion towards the first group is confined to pity, these sentiments turn into aversion and irritation when it comes to the second group. The third group manages to keep public support, evade harassment, carry out effective activities, and become changemakers in an authoritative ambiance.

The 31-year-old J.G, an ecoactivist, has a bachelor's degree in economics from his hometown university in Baku and a master's degree in environmental policy and governance at Bristol University within the Chewing scholarship program. Back in 2018, together with a few confederates he founded Ecofront to protect forests.

 

J.G.`s eco-activism is peculiar since it comprises his eco-activist volunteer background with personal and professional experience in forestry that has distinguished him from the rest of his colleagues. While being informed of the deforestation issue from within (he was a temporary contractor at the forestry department of the Ministry of Ecology for 10 months) and empowered by relevant education gained abroad, his professional goal was to bring effective changes in forestry management and protect existing forest lands. Whereas the personal goal was to distinguish himself and his group from the rest.

 

I have always been active in ecological organizations. In 2010, eco activity in Azerbaijan was virtually gone. Green Baku, Friends of Nature, and other initiatives have been involved in clean-up mainly. We did it on weekends and afterward were drinking tea together. But one could never convince them that we have to object to any ecological problem. They still exist, slow down their activities, and don't object to any problems. It can't be called an eco-activism. I didn't like "their activism". I thought that while I couldn't change the organizations I worked with the way desired, I could create my one. The existing ones were, so to say, very "soft." They were reluctant to politicize issues. With a complete distraction from politics, there is no way to be a full eco-activist. Monitoring consumers` behavior, not eating meat, or throwing away plastic and litter are primitive eco-activities. When we started the EcoFront, the goal was to focus on more serious issues. If there is a political factor behind an ecological problem, it should be revealed. If you are talking about only its obvious sides, you will never achieve your goal. But you will just talk for talking. I came up with the name Ecofront and I sketched the logo. It means an ecological battle.

There could be several explanations for his attitude and viewpoint. Apart from Javid`s pure enthusiasm and devotion to ecological issues, by creating his organization he was aiming at filling in the gap on the "doers part" of the Azerbaijani spectrum of ecoactivists. He positioned himself and his organization as a “hard” actor opposite to “soft ones”. Awareness raising and other related NGO activities are not always eco-activism. In Azerbaijani NGO realities this could be a workplace for some, employing opportunities for others, hobbies, as well as promoting someone's (e.g. a protector) public image. True eco-activism is revealing, investigating, and objecting to an existing ecological issue. This objection can take various forms radicalizing from time to time and paving the way to irritation of others.

The more effective activities are, the less radically-prone the society becomes. Softer activities take the stage. The goal is to get a result. If the result is not achieved, it may be prone to radicalization of activists and their actions. The inability to unite society members around its activities adds up to activists` radicalization. The emergence and prominence of Ecofront in Azerbaijan were due to Albert Hirschman's "voice". In the current Azerbaijani reality among ecoactivists, the voicing was by far the most complicated decision and the rest of Javid`s colleagues from other organizations preferred to "exit". Some did it due to safety reasons.

The pressure on us is not systematic, but rather episodic, occasional. We were detained a couple of times. I was held in detention three times on ecological issues. Not for a long time, just five to six hours but anyway. Twice police detained us in Qusar, northern Azerbaijan. Once, border guards stopped us from filming forest massacres because we violated the border crossing regulations with my colleague Kanan. It was a successful campaign. There were 300 acres of land on the border. They wanted to destroy it. Several trees were already cut down. We trespassed the area without any permission from border guards. They passed us to the police. We paid a fine and got released. Usually, police hold so-called prophylactic conversations i.e. urge us not to act like this next time. Otherwise, we will face more serious consequences.

However, I think there are certain red lines. In case we cross them, we will face problems from authorities. I guess if one does not make obvious political calls, the authorities consider ecological issues so to say neutral ones. We overtly name officials in charge of wrongdoings. We have not seen any legal or other consequences for that or intimidation so far. If we manage to provide proof and give names, we won't experience problems. So far, we named Pasha Holding (believed to belong to the ruling family) or Kamaladdin Heydarov (incumbent Minister of Emergency State, once one of the most powerful politicians in Azerbaijan). We pointed out many wrongdoings in the projects of many other officials. Nevertheless, I think if we make an active political call, then we could have some problems.

 

This owes to the fact that although constitutionally freedom of assembly is among granted rights, in reality, it is a tricky challenge to call on a political protest that gathers masses. According to the Freedom House 2023 index, Azerbaijan is a non-free country with an overall score of 9 out of 100. Whereas the country has 7 of 60 points in Civil liberties, it holds only 2 out of 40 in Political rights. 

If someone joins an unauthorized protest, he or she will be immediately detained, and further consequences will aggravate depending on his /her behavior. Moreover, it means that NGO`s actions will be considered radical in the eyes of the public and fewer or no people will join or support them in any way in the future. In Azerbaijani political culture, raising placards, voicing demands and mottos, and sitting protests are all parts of a broader radical protester`s image. Instead, a result-oriented NGO seeks not to create an image of a relentless struggler, but rather a successful doer or agent. If it aims to reach its goal, it should accept the existing game rules. The NGO has to earn its legitimacy in the public eye. And successful activities, not noisy protests will form its legitimacy.

By observing set game rules and having created corresponding images, traditional methods of protests as well may be added to their arsenal. A hundred NGO supporters that gather in a sitting protest before, say, ministries to demand change will put the latter in a state of panic every next minute of a protest. The latter will constantly ask themselves why these hundred people are standing there. Even without actively doing something, they can achieve the set goal of causing anxiety. However, small numbers of, say,  3-5 people, won't help no matter how noisy they are. One needs to decide if his/her struggle is an ideological one. If so, it denies any compromise. If it is result-oriented it could lead to adjusting to existing rules with achieved goals as renumeration in the end. In the first case, one can`t tolerate anything that goes against his ideology. By doing so, he could fall into history as a relentless and uncompromised actor without guarantees that his activities would be successful. In the Azerbaijani realities, it can lead to imprisonment with further release and acquittal of the European court accompanied by the compensation due to be paid by the Azerbaijani government. However, the most disappointing thing is that not everybody will care about the activists` fate preferring to consign him/her to oblivion.

 

26 years old K.K. is the managing director who is responsible for day-to-day office activities. An electrical engineer by education, he once saw Ecofront`s cleanup on social media and decided to join more than three years ago.

 

I know an activist who lives in a village who has become marginalized and has nothing to do with the village`s community. And even if that person loves nature, he can't get the support of the people around him. Building a personal story, leaving a trace in history, is another story. There is very little room for setting up a personal story in eco-activism. When you don't get results you watch those tragedies and it affects you a lot.  When we can't prevent an ecological crime, it shocks us, when we can get it - it gives us and our supporters hope. We do not have the luxury of breaking the hope of our supporters to ensure our ego, to pursue our ambitions.  

Followers` support is a rare achievement to boast of among Azerbaijani NGOs. Only some can enjoy it. It is due to a successful strategy that brings fruits "on the ground". It is reflected in:

     •      activity results

(For the last couple of years areas of forests for leasing dropped from 7500 acres to 1700 and 150 in 2019,2020, and 2021 as well as dismissal and prosecution of state officials for wrongdoings that became revealed also thanks to Ecofront activities. For example, two forestry officials in the north-western Azerbaijan in late 2023 or head of the executive power in Gusar, northern Azerbaijan in May 2024) 

     •      growing number of followers and volunteers

(Currently, the number of followers on, say, Facebook crossed 31,000)    

 

•      of whistleblowers

(None of the information that comes to the NGO  is confidential i.e. its dissemination can not bear any legal consequences. It is forestry administration, ministry employees, ordinary people, as well as employed staff of businesses where forest destruction takes place who disseminate with the group necessary information)

 

•      enhance material-technical base such as renting an office

(the NGO brings together its members, and volunteers for awareness raising, and holding self-development training

 

•      raising numbers of subscribers and donors' contributions.

The last point is especially important as it indicates how sustainable and financially independent the NGO is. The former leads to the establishment of a sense of proximity and affiliation. The latter - to public trust, success, and independence. I will touch upon the financial transparency a bit later.

Another important factor contributing to a successful strategy is setting your red lines and never crossing them. One should never flatter a criminal, a corrupted official, or a lawbreaker. Flattering is a red line. Demand can be put forward without flattering. Another no-way is to appeal to supreme institutions e.g. the president for every minor matter. The institutional hierarchy should be observed as abusing it could lead to drawing a line over all the other methods. On the other hand, a successful strategy will pave the way to jealousy and scorn of colleagues and other peer organizations which is another indication of being on the right track.

The most vulnerable eco-activists are not always on the surface, especially in rural areas. For example, a community activist who wants to oppose destructive activity may even be fatally affected by, say, a business agent. Or, he or she may encounter the psychological pressure of the community as according to the latter, eco-activists, destroy their workplaces, deprive them of jobs, new roads, etc. Ecoactivism comes with anticipated danger to the activist`s safety. Whereas one opposes some kind of deluding activity, when one physically intervenes in it, there are already serious pressures and threats to his or her safety.

No other organization other than EcoFront has dealt with this. Not only have the others been able to help, but they have not even managed to put their positions in place once the names of important men and the oligarchs have been sounded. The former prefer to stand on the safe sidelines and take a quiet stance. While off the record some praise Ecofront for "working well", they never expose their standpoint even in a short publication on social media. There are others as well who stand against their colleagues in Ecofront accusing them of exaggerating matters. 

Some people think we are dealing with insignificant matters. Others say we fear to engage in political activism. But when you go in you realize it is more dangerous. And if anything happens to you, society will not stand up for it because "it is a minor issue".  Or, we are condemned by some for not being demanding or radical enough. Some have that expectation, others say why don't we flatter? If our goal is to protect the forest and we can do it by flattering, why don't we do it? They accuse us of caring for our egos.

As for financial transparency, the more transparent an NGO appears, the more trustworthy it seems for society in general and supporters in particular. Financial independence is one of the pillars of its successful functioning. However, it bears certain advantages and disadvantages. While successfully functioning a volunteer organization in its development comes to a point when it needs to have staff members. Increasing workload, a focal point for communication with peer organizations as well as state entities and other grassroots organizations, and simply personal lives and leisure times of volunteers are among the factors that make this decision to pop up inevitable. Once staff is hired, accountability is higher and NGO donors and supporters can easily demand from the former on financial costs it bears when carrying out activities. 

On the other hand, it can contribute to creating an image of red tape that always has had negative connotations among people since many could regard it as a haven for gaining money, a comfy workplace. Last but not least, it could lead to a loss of the sense of romanticism. In the case of Ecofront, ecoactivism has always been linked to certain romanticism just as protecting forestry has always had volunteers as its driving force.     

Turbofolk, a bastion of Balkanness: Path from destruction to creation

Ismayil Fataliyev 

In this essay, I would like to talk about the phenomenon of turbo-folk in the Balkans. Endemic, purely Balkan invention, a branch of pop-folk music dressed in modern pop-music vetements, it symbolizes and goes beyond pop music, entertainment, and consummatory tastes of people living in and out the Balkans. The author argues that, even though widely denied and neglected due to current political agendas, it is rather an element of the joint cultural DNA of people inhabiting the Balkans.

This piece of writing will try to show that people living in the space of ex-Yugoslavia, the federation that disappeared three decades ago, intentionally or not have managed to keep transcendent humanitarian links, kinness, belonging to the common socio-mental domain. And the turbo-folk is one of the tools that has made it happen. The essay is not about popular representatives of this music genre such as Ceca, Severina, Seka Aleksic, and others, their lives and career although some facts from their biographies will help to reveal the popularity of turbo-folk throughout the region and beyond. The other important reason for naming female turbo-folk singers is to point out the role turbo-folk music, according to the author, plays in shaping the feminist and gender agenda in predominantly masculine regions of the Balkans.         

This essay is a set of personal impressions, opinions, and interpretations of the turbo-folk phenomenon by a Balkan outsider, a kind of third-party viewer. Even though having used references to scholars and researchers on this topic, the author is not claiming it to be the final truth. Nor does he attempt to deny opposing views. The fact that the author comes from a culturally different area can lead to certain omissions.    

Plenty of academic writings and books about the phenomenon of the turbo-folk have been published. Turbofolk as the initial Serbian successor of the pop-folk along with similar branches that appeared in Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania after the collapse of socialism in the Balkans has always been considered a low-class music. First, the political elites of Yugoslavia in the 70th, then of independent Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania were opposing the rise in popularity of the respective branches. However, it did not prevent them, namely Serbian authorities in the Milosevic era,  from using it in their political agenda during the Balkan wars in the 1990s and easily got rid of them in the second half of the 90s.    

The popularity of turbo folk and the previous emergence of pop-folk music in Yugoslavia was a natural process. Contrary to other socialist camp countries, Yugoslavia proved an exception with wider opportunities for cultural exchange with the West and not omnipresent censorship. That made elements of globalized culture spread in the country. The political elites favored this process and contributed to rooting it in the Balkans. Simply put pop-folk in late and post-Tito`s times and the subsequent spread of its post-communist, modern version, the turbo-folk, first in Serbia and then in Croatia, BiH, and Slovenia was a certain reaction and resistance to de-Balkanization of culture supported by authorities. 

From a sociological point of view, the emergence of pop-folk and the development of its branches is indicative of the incompleteness of urbanization, and modernization in the Balkans as well as social inequalities. When it comes to the first, it was, by and large, the urban elites that associated pop-folk and its modern branches with rural migrants, guest workers, the urban working class, and new rich people. When it comes to the second, the majority of current popular singers of turbo-folk are of rural descent. So to say, it provided them with an opportunity to succeed. Music played a role in a social life that the state was not capable or eager to provide. 

While political elites described this music as backward and primitive, it was exactly these features to were used by its performers to the full extent to underline the specificity of the Balkan region and its people. But instead of primitivism, down-to-earth emotions, feelings, and desires have been successfully exploited. Considered low-culture, the turbo-folk addressed topics that are of common interest to all Balkan residents. First, there were topics of emigration, nostalgia, and homesickness in the 90s as tens of thousands fled to Western and Central Europe and joined other tens of thousands who had left the country in socialist times to win bread and all of them cherished this music as a kind of haven. 

With relative stabilization after the destructive wars to gain ground in the Balkans, turbo-folk switches to modern topics of consumerism, sex, fashion, and nightlife.  However, it would not be right to associate its success with the instinctive daily needs and lust of people. Although compared to Socialist Yugoslavia where  NCFM (Nowo Kompowana Folk Muzika i.e. newly composed folk music genre), the basic tissue of today`s turbo-folk and other branches of pop-folk, focused on closeness and intimacy of topics in Balkans that dramatically opposed unknown anonymous Eupore and America, the contemporary rather watered-down repertoire of its singers loosely but manage to keep the feeling of transnational commonness alive.

Although Rambo Amadeus, a Balkan jazz musician and the author of the term turbo-folk, accepts that this music was initially referred to as a parody of folk, the abovementioned derision of rural primitivism, nationalism, and value judgment as a low-culture, kitsch music, it underlined imagined Balkan temperament, mentality, spontaneity, passion, and emotion that vividly contrasted with the lifeless West. 

Once turbo-folk got rid of “nationalism” in its content, especially after the 2000s, and focused on Balkan identity instead, its follower numbers increased particularly among young people. Accompanied by the personal life experience of its performers, the turbo-folk transcended the nation-state and paved the way for transnational solidarity making the listener a part of a larger imagined community. 

Culturally, turbo-folk across the borders of ex-Yugoslavia is perceived differently. However, it is an incontestable fact that this music is popular and constant. For example, in Croatia, turbo-folk is synonymous with the so-called cultural other i.e. something that is not already an outsider but not “ours” yet as well. It won't become “ours”  but it is a part of our life. In popular opinion, it is a Serbia-born phenomenon even though the country has its turbo-folk stars and bands. The content and attitude also differ from the Serbian one. While the latter addresses distress and anxiety that are common in the population of the entire region, in Croatia performers tend to mock Serbia-associated content, specificity of performance of this music genre, even to make fun of it.  They call it outsider due to political reasons because the mainstream political narrative and public perception that owes to the devastating Balkan wars imply that a Croat is Croat because he is not a Serb. Therefore, what is sad for a Serb is a matter of fun for a Croat and vice versa. 

However, public opinion barometres on turbo-folk show that just elsewhere in the Balkans this music is an inevitable part of everyday life and in Croatia. As the presenter of the popular Croatian TV show concluded following results of a series of TV debates of pro and anti-turbo-folk camps in the 2000s, this music genre functions as a form of social release and cultural antidote to the transition towards neoliberalism and the effects of globalization.” The war between Serbs and Croats and political memory is by far the biggest reason why Croats won't accept turbo-folk as it is. However, simultaneously they can't ignore it either since honey is sweet but the bees sting.   

In Slovenia, turbo-folk is the symbol of the exotic Balkan. It is popular among the youth that take this music now as cool. And it is not an accident. In the early 2000s, research and analysis on music consumption among Slovene youth showed that turbo-folk as a genre was in third place in terms of popularity, just after pop music (11%) and rock music (18%), and much ahead of alternative music that is listened to by only 2% of 16–25 year-olds. The previous reference shows that it still keeps increasing its popularity. Why so? Do many Slovenes prefer not to refer to themselves as Balkan people, according to the mainstream narrative, calling once neighboring nations from ex-Yugoslavia ``southerners”? It seems that popular tastes, and preferences can not only be calculated due to political conjuncture and mainstream political agenda that associate the country with German cultural terrain thanks to belonging to the Habsburg empire during the last four centuries. After another century of being an integral part of various states of Southern Slavs, the nation's identity is seemingly at the intersection of being semi-German and semi-Balkan. While mainstream politics and media are eager for the German or Central European component to prevail and even dominate, the natural internal Balkanness does not let it happen. And undoubtedly turbo-folk music plays a certain role in this as numbers of its listeners increase especially among the youth. Moreover, more frequent direct communication with “southerners” that ordinary Slovenes have while on summer vacation at the Adriatic coast and further inward, contribute to it too. I think Slovens` “cool” for turbo-folk is a lot different from the “cool” of a European from the rest of the continent. It is not occasional, temporary, or artificial. 

In BiH, it is a combination of two attitudes towards the turbo folk music which is obvious given the decentralized nature of the BiH: Croats prefer to mock it, Bosniaks take it for cool, Serbs - follow the pattern in Serbia, the Cica`s pattern of which I will talk a bit later in the context of the role this genre has played in first demoting and later promoting the gender agenda in the region. In BiH, turbo-folk was popular in war times. It gained popularity even afterward although it received no support from international funds that promoted culture in the post-war Balkan region mainly due to the bad reputation of the turbo-folk being a nationalistic tool in war times and the negative memory it generated. Since the 2000s and on, performers of turbo-folk in BiH largely go beyond local or nationalist politics trying to follow market and pop music estrada rules first. Turbo-folk performer Seka Aleksić's professional and personal experience is evident in this regard. Although being banned or restricted on TV, the generation of these turbo-folk performers not only vanished but prospered. In my opinion, this is another indication of the non-artificial popular nature and support for this genre.

In the Balkans, many post-socialist regions have suffered from the sudden vacuum that appeared after the collapse of the socially oriented Yugoslavia. One of the biggest achievements during the socialist Yugoslavia times was the promotion of women's roles and rights both in personal and professional life in the mainly paternalistic and patriarchal societies of the entities Yugoslavia consisted of. Together with the federation's collapse, this social politics started to lag. Disastrous wars in the region contributed to aggravating the situation of women. While socialist Yugoslavia safeguarded women's rights as well as created promotion opportunities as never before in the region, the post-socialist period revealed the old and opened new wounds: atomization of families, inequality in employment, human trafficking in women, prostitution, and domestic violence.  

 

On one hand, according to feminist organizations functioning in the region since the 90s, turbo folk music has been the genre that hugely exploited women. It constructed the image of a pliant subordinate Balkan woman that is aimed at nothing but exciting men. Sanja Sarnavka from the B.a.B.e organization complains that due to this music genre, women are reduced to their bodies and their appearances. Partly, it is true as it echoes the genre`s heritage of the 90s. Together with women dressed in erotic vetements, accordion playing, and oriental sounds, turbo-folk referred to kafana tradition, a traditional men`s assembly point for leisure and relaxation. While it was on, gender-related issues such as domestic violence against women, a widespread problem in Southeast Europe, have been a private matter. Leave aside a subject of legislation or public policy. Widespread open sexism in Southeast Europe at the workplace, in the media, in advertisements, and politics was complemented with a machismo, heroic concept in the Balkans. 

As mentioned above, during the disastrous wars in the Balkans, turbo-folk was instrumental in supporting the mainstream nationalistic narrative of the Milosevic government. It was he who gave the green light to many performers of the genre to promote his agenda. One performer stands apart from others. This is Svetlana Raznatowicz, better known as Ceca, a Serbian turbo-folk performer. 

Her personal and professional paths go hand in hand with the role turbo-folk has played in forming the gender and feminist agenda of the region. Having gained her popularity in the Milosevic era, she has been taken since then as a nationalistic camp performer. It was these times when turbo-folk was also instrumental in further weakening women`s positions and describing them as an object of sexual pleasure, servant, not an independent subject i.e. the very narrative of the feminist organizations on turbo-folk`s role. 

Interestingly, the performer denies any allegations of nationalism saying she sang about her love for Serbia. It is worth mentioning that the single anti-war song she had then never went on air in Serbia and beyond. However, her marriage with a famous nationalist, a war beneficent who was allegedly a war criminal, was widely broadcast in Serbia which undoubtedly gained her reputation as a nationalistic performer. His death and her return to her music career changed the media perception of her in the Balkans. Considered the Balkan Madonna (a well-known US pop diva), she is extremely popular among the youth in the ex-entities of Yugoslavia. 

Once the genre got rid of nationalism chains, its content gained down-to-earth topics comprehensive for ordinary people.  While many other performers of turbo-folk (and popular music in general) want to show ‘attitude’ through their content with powerful and emotive voices, Ceca tends to lean toward sensations that are commonly found among the population. 

Academically speaking, her music enacts emotions that are present in the public:  frustration with the current economic situation, still ongoing violence and the impossibility of getting to know its true reasons, dissolution of the family as a social unit, pressures of an emotional relationship, and the failure of newly-born Balkan states to face their most recent mutual history objectively. On a regular person`s understanding, she addresses and positions her diverse audiences and their anxieties, dreams, and hopes. The analysis of the poll conducted in 2010 among teenagers in Slovenia and Croatia to reveal reasons for Ceca`s popularity, showed that youngsters there do not only associate Ceca with “the celebration of the exotic and spectacular but also the power of a woman who is similar to “us,” full of pain, suffering, and despair.” Amazingly, her young Croat followers who lost family members and close friends in the Balkan wars were instinctively turning a blind eye to her wartime reputation and ties with radical Serbian nationalists.   

Ceca turned into a powerful role model, especially because she is a celebrity “from below” of rural descendants. Despite this fact, her success promises similar success for the youth. Her example shows that the rise of individual talent and new forms of social mobility are not fictitious. The analysis`s authors conclude that no matter how they listen to her music, Ceca represents cultural leadership and psychological reinforcement. And the fact that she is a Balkan woman with rural roots magnifies this effect.  Interestingly, the gender roles of turbo-folk female performers destabilize the limits of Serb-Orthodox nationalism as well. Simply put, it deprives the masculine Serbian church of a monopoly on nationalism.

In 2009 there was another study by Predrag Cvitanovic of over 100 (former) Yugoslav songs that refer to “Balkan”. He divides the musical use of “Balkan as metaphor” into four categories: Balkan as an area of war and conflict; Balkan as a source of joy, passion, and fatalism; gendered Balkan (primitive male/beautiful and resistant female); and Balkan as Europe’s other. In the case of turbo-folk, most musical references to the Balkans fall under the category of “joy, passion, and fatalism.”

In these songs, we can see another indication of the emancipating role of turbo-folk in the Balkans. This is a gradual de-monopolization of the katana, a traditional women-free, male cafe/leisure spot and assembly point. The turbo-folk singers transferred their performances into it and made listeners and watchers get used to the fact that the century-long monopolistic rights of men in public places have long gone. 

Conclusion

 

Turbo-folk music is in the DNA of people living in the terrain of what used to be Yugoslavia. It is just like one of many elements that indicate belonging to the Balkans i.e. things that are not fashionable and advantageous to expose but impossible to forget due to reluctance and and so to get rid of. Although it is expressed differently, one can't deny that it also helps to keep the sense of Balkanness sustainable. 

Simply put, if a hypothetical Croat, Serb, Slovene, or Bosniak hears the rhythm of turbo-folk somewhere else beyond the Balkans, they will unintentionally flock around the source of the music. And when it comes to gender issues in the region, contemporary turbo-folk is rather constructive, not destructive music. Its destructive element was the nationalistic agenda in its performances that disappeared with the Balkan wars of the 90s.